Research demonstrates that police reduce crime. The implication of this research for investment in a particular form of extra police services, those provided by private institutions, has not been rigorously examined. We capitalize on the discontinuity in police force size at the geographic boundary of a private university police department to estimate the effect of the extra police services on crime. Extra police provided by the university generate approximately 45-60 percent fewer crimes in the surrounding neighborhood. These effects appear to be similar to other estimates in the literature.
dosage differences across days of the week, Cohen and Ludwig use a difference-in-difference-indifferences design to estimate that days with intensive patrol experienced 34% and 71% decreases in average daily gun shots fired and assault-related gun injuries. Klick and Tabarrok (2005) use daily changes in the deployment of police officers due to changes in the terror alert level set by the Department of Homeland Security. The authors found that in Washington, DC, increased police presence is associated with a 6.6% drop in total crime. Even stronger effects were observed in the Capitol Hill District where the highest numbers of police officers were deployed during terror alerts. Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) conducted a similar quasiexperimental design, but focused on street blocks rather than days of the week. Following a terrorist attack on a Jewish center in Buenos Aires in 1994, the police deployed additional patrols to areas of the city with Jewish institutions. Assuming that the resulting geographic allocation of patrols was exogenous to crime, Di Tella and Schargrodsky compare the rate of car thefts before and after the attack in areas with and without Jewish institutions. After the attack, car thefts dropped by 75% on street blocks with a Jewish institution relative to street blocks without a Jewish institution. They found no effect on car thefts just one or two blocks away from Jewish institutions, suggesting that the deterrent effect of police deployment is highly localized. Draca et al. (2011) recently examined the effects of police on crime by comparing changes in crime before and after a terrorist bombing in London, which resulted in the immediate deployment of supplementary police officers to central London. The rest of London did not receive the increase in officers. They also have the benefit of a research design that can examine what happens after the extra deployment to central London is lifted. Their difference-in-differences design shows that a 10% increase in police deployment reduced crime in central London by 3 to 4%. Berk and MacDonald (2010) use a similar quasi-experimental design to test the effects of a police crackdown in downtown Los Angeles by comparing crime rates before and after the additional deployment in downtown Los Angeles relative to adjacent police divisions. They observe a 30-39% relative reduction in crimes associated with the extra police officers.
In addition to the quasi-experimental literature described above, there is also a body of field experiments in criminology that tests the effect of supplementary deployment to high crime "hot spots." Sherman and Weisburd (1995) identify the 110 highest crime street blocks in Minneapolis, MN and randomly assigned 55 of these blocks to receive a "crackdown-back off" deployment pattern in which police cars spent as much as one extra hour per shift in each of the treatment areas. The study found that treatment areas experienced a 6% to 13% relative reduction in crime compared to control areas, with the largest effects observed for disorder crimes. Other field experiments have also found that targeted police patrols in high crime areas reduce crime and disorder (Weisburd and Green, 1995; Braga et al., 1999; Braga and Bond, 2008) . These studies all focus on highly localized areas for short durations in time. They do not rule out the possibility that police deployment displaces crime to adjacent areas. There is little empirical evidence that supports the displacement hypothesis (Weisburd et al., 2006) , but with any small-scale field experiment it is possible that the positive local effects are being offset by shifting crime to other areas not observed.
This review of the empirical literature provides strong evidence that the size of the police and their deployment produces substantial social welfare benefits. However, the existing empirical literature on the effect of police activities is largely idiosyncratic and short-term; it focuses on rare spikes in police deployment due to terror events, or police crackdowns. These designs fail to measure the effect of sustained increases in deployment. Research on police crackdowns, for example, implies that their deterrent effect would dissipate over time if they became a permanent fixture of police department tactics. Moreover, it is possible that crime reductions associated with short-term terrorism-related deployment may derive from increased officer vigilance or alertness. It is unlikely this increased level of vigilance could be maintained for long periods of time without further risk of terrorist events. Thus, relatively little is known about the sustained effect of normal police deployments over long periods of time.
Privately Funded Police and the University of Pennsylvania
The University of Pennsylvania (Penn) maintains the largest privately funded publicly certified police department in the Pennsylvania, employing roughly 100 full-time sworn police officers. The department is the third largest university police department in the United States (Reaves, 2008) . The primary role of the University of Pennsylvania Police Department (UPPD) is crime prevention within and around the Penn campus. Figure 1 depicts three key geographic areas to which we refer throughout the remainder of the paper. First, the Inner Penn Campus, demarcated by a thick line, refers to the campus proper; it primarily includes residential dormitories, classroom buildings, administrative university offices, restaurants and stores. 
Data and Descriptive Statistics
We obtained detailed reports of every crime reported in the University City District between 2005 and 2010. We classify crimes into four categories: total crimes, violent crimes (assaults, murder, rape, and robbery), property crimes (all non-violent offenses), and street crimes (assaults, burglaries, purse snatch, robberies, theft from vehicles). We created the street crime classification because these offenses are more likely to occur in the direct visibility of police patrols.
The crime data includes detailed address locations for 19,611 crimes. 6 Using GIS software, we calculated the distance between the location of each crime and the UPPD boundary. 7 We then averaged these distances within each of the 398 city blocks in the sample to estimate the distance of each block from the boundary. For the four blocks where no crimes occurred in the sample period, we used the distance from the block's centroid to the UPPD boundary. 8 Crimes inside the Penn Patrol Zone are assigned a negative distance value and crimes outside the Penn Patrol Zone are assigned a positive value. Crimes on the boundary (e.g., at 40th and Market) are assigned a distance of zero and are, thus, included within the Penn Patrol boundary.
Incident data were then aggregated up to the block level. A small number of blocks were split across both sides of the Penn Patrol boundary, and were thus treated as two separate blocks for the purpose of our analysis. We aggregate without consideration for time (i.e., collapse six years of data into a single cross section) because the source of our identifying variation, the patrol boundary, does not vary temporally. Of the 398 census blocks located with University City District, 148 fall within the UPPD patrol boundary. Table 1 shows that during the six-year period for which data are available there were an average of 71 crimes per block in the Inner Penn and 40 in the Outer Penn Campus. The bulk of these crimes were property offenses, especially thefts from buildings. Blocks in the Outer Penn Campus experienced higher rates of street crime, as do blocks outside located in the University District outside of the Outer campus. This descriptive comparison does not take into consideration that blocks further away from the campus are different in many respects (e.g., public housing complexes) from blocks closer to campus. It is, therefore, not plausible to generate causal inference from this simple description of the crime data. 6 Crimes reported include aggravated assault, aggravated assault with guns, assault, auto theft, bike theft, burglary, homicide, homicide with gun, purse snatch, retail theft, robbery, robbery with gun, and sex offense, theft, theft from building, theft from vehicle. Twenty-three of these cases fall outside of the University City District and are excluded from the analysis, leaving the total count of analyzed crimes to 19,588. 7 We received the geographic information on the boundaries from the UPPD. See http://www.publicsafety.upenn.edu/assets/General-Web-Photos/PennPatrolpdf.pdf. 8 Our results are qualitatively similar if we use the centroid measurement for all blocks. 
Regression Discontinuity Design
Regression discontinuity designs provide the opportunity to draw causal inferences from non-experimental data when appropriately identified. Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001) and Lee (2008) show that the identifying assumptions in a regression discontinuity design are relatively weak in comparison to other standard approaches in empirical microeconomics. In our context, the primary requirement is the absence of systematic differences relevant to crime between areas just inside and just outside of the Penn patrol boundary.
The Penn patrol boundary constitutes an effective geographic discontinuity. The boundary is, in many respects, a historical artifact. The University of Pennsylvania's strategy since the mid-1990s has been to merge the university and the surrounding neighborhood, investing heavily in infrastructure, including housing, retail establishments, and primary schooling options for local residents (Kromer and Kerman, 2004; Rodin, 2005 For our purposes, however, it is important that there is a policy relevant discontinuity created by the boundary. Specifically, as discussed above, there is a significantly higher police presence protecting those blocks within the boundary than those outside of it.
In our initial analyses, we exclude the Inner Penn Campus because it is composed of classroom buildings, university office space, dormitories, a hospital, and sports facilities, making it less comparable to the residential and retail areas that exist on either side of the Outer Campus boundary. As shown later, this exclusion does not affect our analysis.
Following Lee (2008) , we use a polynomial regression specification where we control for the distance from the city block to the campus boundary. Blocks inside the boundary are assigned negative distance values and blocks outside of the boundary are assigned positive values. We allow these control terms to take the form of nth degree polynomials that differ depending on whether the given city block is inside or outside of the boundary (i.e., each polynomial term is interacted with a dummy variable indicating whether the block is inside the boundary). The average estimated crime conditional the extra university police is estimated as follows:
The variable W is a dummy indicator that assumes value 1 for each block (denoted i) inside the patrol zone boundary, and the terms θ and ρ represent quartic degree (n=1 to 4) polynomial parameters for the inside (UPPD) or outside (UCD) average block distances (denoted by d) for crimes on blocks from the boundary. This polynomial specification is flexible, since it is well known in the RD literature that the assumption of a constant treatment effect continuously away from the cutoff is not identifiable (Cook, 2008; Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw, 2001) .
Standard errors are also corrected for dependence within blocks using a cluster sandwich estimator. As in Lee (2008) , we focus on the specification using a quartic function allows for differing effects of this function depending on whether the block is inside or outside the boundary. However, we used k-fold cross validation techniques to examine the sensitivity of model performance to this choice, finding little difference in model performance across polynomial functions of orders zero through five. Further, inspection of the estimated treatment coefficients yielded few differences even through a polynomial of order 10. Table 2 provides results 9 comparing blocks inside and outside the Penn Patrol Zone boundary, excluding the Inner Penn Campus. While crime is generally lower in the Penn campus, as shown in column i which does not control for any distance effects, once we use the polynomial function of distance to isolate the relevant comparable areas inside and outside the boundary, we find that there are 27 fewer crimes on each block inside the boundary as compared to the counterfactual blocks outside the boundary. This effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, and it represents a relative reduction of 56 percent. Figure 2 shows the relationship between average block distance to the boundary, and the total number of crimes over the period observation. As is evident from Figure 2 , the patterns of crime are non-linear as the distance from the patrol zone boundary increases and there is apparent higher density of crimes as one gets to further distances away. The drop in crime at the border is a visual depiction of our point estimate. Again, we note that the location of this boundary was largely a historical accident, and there is no simple explanation for the drop in crime at the boundary other than the location of extra UPPD police.
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Figure 2: Crime by Block Distance from Patrol Boundary
In Table 3 , we examine the effect of Penn's increased policing separately by crime category. For each category, the estimated coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level or lower. The magnitude of the effects is comparable across crime categories.
Violent crime is 60 percent lower, property crime is 55 percent lower, and street crime is 46 lower inside of the Penn patrol boundary. with the institutional knowledge that the Inner Penn Campus is substantively different than the areas around the boundary led us to exclude the 42 blocks in the Inner Penn Campus from our analysis. However, to ensure that our model is well identified, we present results in Table 4 that include the blocks in the Inner Penn Campus. In each crime category, our results exhibit trivial changes at most. Table 5 provides results for each individual crime type. While there is some variation in the relative effects across specific crimes, the treatment effects are generally negative and substantively important. There are four exceptions. We do not find a negative effect for handgun-homicides, purse snatchings, or thefts from buildings, though none of these positive effects can be distinguished from the null hypothesis of no difference. It is worth noting that handgun-homicides and homicides that are the result of other means are rare events, accounting for only 0.15% (n=31) of all crimes. Purse snatchings are also relatively rare (0.55%; n=55) and occur mostly along central business corridors. Theft from buildings is not a street crime that is easily detectable by police patrols. Table 5 . One can clearly see that the majority of crimes are lower in blocks inside the Penn patrol boundary. Our results paint a fairly consistent picture. Comparing seemingly similar blocks on either side of an arbitrary boundary which increased police patrols do not cross, we find that more police protection is associated with lower crime. This effect is statistically and practically significant across nearly all crime categories. It is also largely invariant to the choice of regression specification, and the inclusion of data points farther from the discontinuity.
While we have focused on a polynomial based regression discontinuity approach, kernel based approaches provide similar conclusions. Using Imbens and Kalyanaraman's approach (2011), which optimizes the tradeoff between statistical efficiency and bias in determining threshold bandwidth, we find even larger crime reductions inside the Penn boundary, on the order of 85 percent. While we prefer to focus on the more conservative estimates detailed above, even those larger effect estimates may be understated. Penn Campus Effect by Crime Type
Elasticity Estimates
Personnel estimates from both the Philadelphia Police Department and the UPPD indicate that approximately twice as many officers patrol the Outer Penn Zone than the surrounding University City District. The area covered by Philadelphia Police is twice as big as that covered by the Penn Police, suggesting an effective increase in police presence on the order of 200 percent. Our estimate that UPPD activity is associated with a 60 percent reduction in crime suggests that the elasticity of crime with respect to police is about -0.30 for both violent and property crimes.
These elasticity estimates are strikingly similar to those found in the modern literature on police and crime. Chalfin and McCrary's (2012; Table 8 ) recent paper provides a helpful summary of these previous estimates. Klick and Tabarrok (2005) , Draca, Machin, and Witt (2011) and Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) -all of which use an exogenous shock in police deployment resulting from terrorism-related events -find an elasticity of approximately -0.30.
Our study suggests that the results of these earlier studies are not driven by some background change that accompanies fears of terrorism or an increase in diligence on the part of police when working during such times. Our results are also similar to those presented in Berk and MacDonald (2010) who examine a police crackdown in Los Angeles and find similar elasticities. Our results also suggest that privately employed police forces generate reductions in crime that are comparable to those associated with public police forces. While the UPPD employs publicly certified law enforcement officers, their salaries are paid for directly by a private university. These findings suggest that augmenting public police forces with substantial private investments can have a meaningful effect on crime rates. Chalfin and McCrary (2012) provide one of the more rigorous estimates of the cost of crime relative to the hiring of police.
They find that in a typical U.S. city, investing a dollar in police hiring yields an average of $1.50 in benefits to the public. From these estimates we can say that the benefits of paying for UPPD services are a large multiple of the costs of employing the extra police. 10
Conclusion
Given the importance of police protection for private firms and the tremendous welfare effect of crime in city neighborhoods, the lack of prior studies on the effects of extra police provided by universities is an important omission. Although others before us laid the groundwork for assessing the causal effect of the police more generally on crime, and their influence on crime when deployed to high crime areas, we provide one of the first examinations of the crime reduction effects of supplemental police services provided on a large-scale by a university on its surrounding neighborhood.
While this study provides a credible estimate of the effect of the UPPD on crime, more research is needed to determine if this effect could be generalized to other settings where universities are located in urban cities. In particular, the geographic discontinuity design we employ could be used in other settings as universities plan to expand their patrol boundaries to provide extra police services to off-campus neighborhoods.
Our identification strategy would be undermined if the Penn patrol boundary was selected because it reflects some natural geographic discontinuity of student living or commercial properties that the university is particularly interested in protecting. To the best of our 10 The costs of salary and benefits for a new UPPD officer is $62,650, which is comparable to the starting salary ($45,420) and benefits (assuming 40%) for the Philadelphia Police is $63,588.
knowledge, the patrol zone was selected as part of a negotiation with the University City District, and there is no evidence that the zone is anything but an attempt to secure the outer ring of the campus and off-campus properties that are considered valuable to the university (Rodin, 2007) .
Fundamentally, there is no reason to think that the demographic or risk profile shifts fundamentally at 2 to 3 blocks beyond the boundary in the University City District. A large number of university students live as far as 50th street, suggesting that street blocks have similar exposure to student risk groups within our bandwidth. The hiring of additional police services appears to be an effective approach to reducing crime.
